Sebastian Ernst

Sebastian Ernst

I am a PhD candidate in Economics at the London School of Economics. My research spans public economics, industrial organization, and labor economics, with a focus on the design and targeting of public programs.

I am on the 2026-27 academic job market.

Working Papers

Caring What It Costs: Subsidy Design in Child Care Job Market Paper

Child care subsidies can generate large positive externalities by promoting human capital development. An important and understudied feature of their design is the extent to which recipients are shielded from price differences. Such shielding can generate social gains by encouraging the use of higher-quality care. When providers have market power, however, it may also lead to higher equilibrium prices, affecting both subsidized and unsubsidized families. Using administrative data and quasi-experimental variation from the United States, I show that reducing recipients' exposure to price differences shifts them toward providers with higher prices and higher quality ratings. Then, in a novel application of bunching methods, I estimate that providers charge 15 percent more when subsidy recipients are fully shielded from price differences than when they are fully exposed. To quantify the welfare effects of subsidy design, I estimate a structural model of child care demand and supply. I compare a benchmark policy based on federal guidelines, which substantially shields recipients from price differences, to an equally costly fixed subsidy that leaves them fully exposed to those differences. The benchmark policy shifts more subsidized children into high-quality care, but reduces both overall child care use and consumer surplus for subsidized and unsubsidized families. Finally, when quality is observable, I find that tying subsidies directly to quality is more efficient than tying subsidies to price across a wide range of policy specifications.

At-Risk or Responsive? Targeting in Unemployment Policy with Andreas I. Mueller, Johannes Spinnewijn and Joost Bollens

This paper evaluates the use of algorithmic risk profiling to direct job search support toward individuals most at risk of long-term unemployment. Using three regression discontinuity designs and rich administrative data from the Flemish Public Employment Service (VDAB) in Belgium, we address two key dimensions: whom and when to target. First, job search counseling raises employment on average, but treatment effects decline sharply with predicted risk. This reveals a fundamental trade-off between targeting those most at risk and those most responsive to intervention. Second, we find no evidence that treatment effects depreciate at the individual level, but strong dynamic selection: as spells lengthen, surviving job seekers have both higher baseline risk and lower treatment responsiveness, with opposing implications for the returns to treatment. We develop and calibrate a conceptual framework for optimal targeting that highlights the key role of the ratio of predicted treatment effects to predicted job-finding probabilities. Targeting rules combining both objects substantially outperform the status quo, yielding welfare gains nearly three times as large as those from random assignment, while targeting on risk scores alone performs worse than random assignment.

Work in Progress

Hiring Subsidies for Older Job Seekers: Evidence from Belgium with Joost Bollens

Older job seekers face a heightened risk of long-term unemployment. Can targeted hiring subsidies improve their employment prospects? We study a Belgian subsidy that reduces employer social security contributions for hiring unemployed workers aged 55 or older. Using administrative data on all unemployment spells in Flanders, Belgium and a regression discontinuity design at the eligibility threshold, we find that the subsidy increases the probability of employment after three months by approximately 5 percentage points, with no detectable indirect effects on ineligible job seekers. These findings suggest that targeted hiring subsidies can improve older workers’ reemployment prospects without large adverse effects on the unsubsidized population.

Targeted Subsidy Design with Price Discrimination: Evidence from Rental Housing

Rental housing subsidies can improve housing affordability but may raise rents in equilibrium. This paper explores whether this equilibrium effect depends on the extent to which a subsidy shields recipients from rent differences across units. An important feature of rental housing markets is that landlords can charge different rents to subsidized and unsubsidized tenants. In a static model with constant marginal cost, landlords set rents independently for the two groups. Reducing recipients’ exposure to rent differences can therefore raise rents for subsidized tenants while leaving them unchanged for unsubsidized tenants. When landlords face capacity constraints and must wait for tenants to arrive, however, pricing for the two groups is no longer independent. Instead, the more landlords can charge subsidy recipients, the more valuable it becomes to leave a unit vacant while waiting for a subsidized tenant. This raises the opportunity cost of renting to an unsubsidized tenant today, leading landlords to charge unsubsidized tenants higher rents as well. Using rental listing data from New York City, I observe bunching in the distribution of advertised rents at kinks in the subsidy schedule, consistent with this mechanism.

Publications

Risk Scores for Long-Term Unemployment and the Assignment to Job Search Counseling with Andreas I. Mueller and Johannes Spinnewijn, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 114: 572–76, May 2024

Replication Package ↗
This paper analyses how risk profiling is used to assign unemployed job seekers to job search counseling in Flanders, Belgium. We compare algorithmic selection to self-selection and selection by job search counselors. We discuss practical challenges for the implementation of risk profiling and highlight avenues for further research. We find that algorithmic assignment is used for only a small fraction of the sample and that job search counselors appear to have valuable private information on job seekers' reemployment prospects beyond what is captured by the algorithmic risk score.